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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHRISTENA B. WHITE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20030110CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of one count each of 
securities fraud and offer or sale by an unlicensed broker/dealer 
or agent, both third degree felonies (R. 3-5). This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should defendant's constitutional arguments, neither 
argued nor ruled upon by the trial court, now be considered for 
the first time on appeal? 
2. Is defendant precluded from arguing on appeal that the 
jury should have been instructed on exemptions from registration 
under the Utah securities laws, where her trial counsel 
specifically agreed that registration was not relevant to this 
case? 
3. Should this Court consider defendant's argument that the 
trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence, 
where defendant's claims lack specificity and are inadequately 
briefed? 
4. Should this Court review defendant's other inadequately 
briefed claims? 
Where claims are inadequately briefed or improperly before 
the Court, this Court declines to address them. State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998). Consequently, no standard of 
review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, governing fraud, provides: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any 
security, directly or indirectly, to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1), governing licensing, provides in 
pertinent part: 
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It is unlawful for any person to transact 
business in this state as a broker-dealer or 
agent unless the person is licensed under 
this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) (a) (i), defining who is an 
"agent" for purposes of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a 
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer 
or issuer in effecting or attempting to 
effect purchases or sales of securities. 
"Agent" does not include an individual who 
represents: 
(a) an issuer, who receives no 
commission or other remuneration, directly or 
indirectly, for effecting or attempting to 
effect purchases or sales of securities in 
this state, and who: 
(i) effects transactions [in 
exempted securities]. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21, governing penalties for 
violations, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree 
felony who willfully violates any provision 
of this chapter except Section 61-1-1. . . . 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 
61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, 
at the time the crime was committed, the 
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained 
or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or 
less. . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of securities 
fraud and offer or sale by an unlicensed broker/dealer or agent, 
both third degree felonies (R. 3-5). Defendant waived a 
preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial on both charges 
(R. 47). A jury convicted her as charged (R. 153, 155). The 
trial court sentenced her to concurrent, suspended terms of zero-
to-five years in the Utah State Prison on each count; fourteen 
days in the Salt Lake County jail; 300 hours of community 
service; and' 36 months probation (R. 169-71). The court also 
ordered that defendant participate in cognitive restructuring 
therapy (Id.). Defendant, acting pro se, filed a timely notice 
of appeal (R. 179) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Scott Ockey, owner of two condominium units at American 
Towers in Salt Lake, ran a newspaper advertisement seeking a 
tenant for one of the units, for which he sought $2000 per month 
rent (R. 203: 23. 25). Defendant, an acquaintance, responded to 
the ad (Id^ at 26). 
Because defendant was short on cash, she and Ockey agreed 
that defendant would pay $1500, the amount of Ockey's mortgage, 
in cash each month. For the first six months of the lease, the 
1
 The facts are recited, as always on appeal, in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 
52, 999 P.2d 565. 
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remaining $500 would be supplied by stock in defendant's 
developing business, Shakti Power, Inc. (Id. at 27-28, 31) . 
Defendant told Ockey that, for purposes of rent, she would value 
the stock at $.10 per share, although it was actually worth $1 
per share (Id. at 28).2 Subsequently, Ockey also agreed to take 
stock in lieu of the first month's rent on the unit (Id. at 29). 
Defendant told Ockey that she wanted to use the condominium as a 
home office for Shakti Power (Id. 31). Ockey responded that it 
was a residential unit and, consequently, that she could only 
rent it as an individual (Id. at 31, 54). She agreed to do so 
(Id. at 32) . 
Prior to entering this agreement, defendant did not inform 
Ockey that she had filed for bankruptcy in 1999 (Id. at 33). Nor 
did she provide him with a financial statement or information 
outlining Shakti's assets (Id. at 34). She did not tell him 
about the risks inherent in the company, how long it had been 
incorporated, or anything about its track record (Id. at 34-35). 
She did, however, tell him that she had substantial New York 
investors involved in the project, which would develop geothermal 
power; that the company had either a "fee title interest or lease 
hold interest" in property near Mammoth, Utah; and that she 
2
 Defendant later told the Director of Enforcement for the 
Utah Division of Securities, that she "just kind of made up" the 
value of $1 per share (R. 203: 97). 
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anticipated trading to begin on the stock shortly (id. at 35, 
62) . 
Prior to signing the lease, defendant told Ockey that her 
board of directors was giving her a hard time about valuing the 
Shakti shares at only $ .10 each (Id. at 32). Describing his 
reaction, Ockey recalled telling defendant, XMI'm not trying to 
create any problems here. You know, if you just want to do the 
straight $2000 as original I'm fine with that'" (Id. at 32). He 
continued, "The $2000 amount was all I was looking for on the 
rental and nothing more and nothing less and I wasn't interested 
in . . . causing any friction between any other parties" (Id.). 
Defendant responded, however, that she had already received 
approval from her board and that she would deliver the shares the 
next week (Id.). 
Defendant delivered two Shakti Power, Inc. stock 
certificates, one for 25,000 shares and one for 30,000 shares, 
both in the name of Scott Ockey (Id. at 38; St. Exh. # 2 , 3). 
Ockey, who had been a licensed broker in the 1980fs, noticed 
immediately that each certificate lacked a corporate seal, a 
CUSIP number, and the name of the transfer agent (R. 203: 36, 38-
39). Concerned, Ockey contacted defendant and asked her, "^Where 
in the hell did you come up with these? It looks like you just 
printed them off" (Id. at 47). He told defendant "that [he] was 
not interested in taking any stock as partial consideration for 
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rent and that if she wanted to rent the premises that it would be 
$2000 a month" (Id^ at 42). Defendant admitted she had printed 
the certificates, but told Ockey she was "in the process of 
getting [new certificates] and would have those in the next few 
days for [him]" (Id. at 42, 47). Ockey never received the new 
certificates (Id. at 42). 
In September, Ockey received a rent check from Shakti Power, 
signed by defendant, for $1500 (Id. at 43; St. Ex. #5). Ockey 
repeatedly tried to cash the check but was unable to do so 
because the account on which it was written contained 




ARGUMENTS, NEITHER ARGUED NOR RULED 
UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT, SHOULD NOT 
NOW BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL 
Of the twelve issues upon which defendant urges 
this Court to reverse her conviction in this pro se brief, four 
are framed as constitutional issues. She asserts that Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-1 is unconstitutionally overbroad; that article I, 
section 5 of the Utah Constitution permits this Court to 
invalidate certain federal laws because they conflict with Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1; and that her Due Process rights were violated 
both by her counsel's waiver of preliminary hearing and by her 
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incarceration in the county jail for 14 days after conviction. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 4-5.3 
Defendant failed to raise any of these four arguments at 
trial and so has waived consideration of them on appeal. "As 
Utah courts have reiterated many times, we generally will not 
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellee 
raises on appeal for the first time." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 77 n.2 (Utah App. 1990); accord State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991). Furthermore, defendant has failed 
to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances, the two 
means by which she might circumvent the waiver doctrine. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 & n.3 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989); Jolivet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989). For these reasons, her 
constitutional claims should not be considered on appeal. 
3
 These are the first, second, seventh, and twelfth 
arguments identified by defendant in her Statement of Issues. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 4-5. They are also referenced in Points Two 
and Three of defendant's brief. See id. at 16-19. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF INVITED ERROR FROM 
ARGUING ON APPEAL THAT THE JURY 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON 
EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION UNDER 
THE UTAH SECURITIES LAWS BECAUSE 
HER TRIAL COUNSEL AGREED THAT 
REGISTRATION WAS NOT RELEVANT TO 
THE CASE 
Defendant argues that vvthe Jury should have been instructed 
regarding the applicable exemptions to the Utah State Securities 
Laws under which the subject transaction occurred," specifically 
exemptions from registration (Br. of Aplt. at 4, 21).4 This 
argument fails at the outset because during the objections to 
jury instructions, defense counsel specifically agreed with the 
trial court that the matter of registration was not relevant to 
the case the State presented against defendant. 
After the State's evidence was in and before defendant 
presented her case, the court discussed proposed jury 
instructions with the parties. See R. 204: 141-68. The 
following interchange occurred: 
Court: [P]art of the issue that [defense 
counsel]'s concerned about is the 
issue of registration or not 
registration, and I'm not sure how 
relevant that is to really what the 
4
 This argument is included as the fifth and sixth issues 
in defendant's Statement of Issues, as well as at Point Five of 
defendant's brief. See Br. of Aplt. at 4, 21-22. The State's 
response encompasses the arguments defendant asserts in Point One 
of her brief as well. 
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State's case has been - which is 
that there was a duty - I mean the 
State presented a pretty simple 
case that there was a duty to 
disclose certain things that 
weren't disclosed, and there was a 
misrepresentation period, and the 
issue of registered and not 
registered doesn't seem to be part 
of the State's case. 
Prosctn: Registration is -
Defense: I agree. 
Prosctn: - we didn't file a lack of 
registration. We agreed this is an 
isolated transaction, so under the 
statute it's not required to be 
registered, so we didn't charge 
that. 
Defense: Agreed. 
Id. at 149-50. 
Given this unambiguous exchange, defendant's argument on 
appeal runs afoul of the invited error doctrine. "The doctrine 
of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at 
trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 
813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Henderson, 
792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The doctrine thus prevents a party from 
VNXtak[ing] advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1220) . Adherence to the invited error doctrine serves dual 
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purposes. First, it ensures that trial courts will have the 
first opportunity to address claims of error. And second, it 
discourages parties from misleading the trial court in order to 
preserve hidden grounds for reversal on appeal. State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, SI54, 70 P.3d 111 (citations omitted). 
In this case, because defense counsel specifically 
acknowledged the irrelevance of the subject matter for which 
defendant now claims a jury instruction should have been given, 
her claim must be rejected. 
POINT THREE 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING CERTAIN EVIDENCE BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS LACK SPECIFICITY 
AND ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by refusing to admit: l)"a significant official document from the 
State of Utah related to defendant's company;" and 2)"information 
regarding the victim, including bankruptcies, previous civil 
actions and his previous relationship with defendant" (Br. of 
Aplt. at 5; see also id. at 20-21). 
Both of these claims fail. First, defendant has not 
specified what document the court refused to admit. Further, she 
has not provided record cites to demonstrate that she offered the 
alleged document into evidence and that the court ruled on it. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (9) provides: "The argument 
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shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, . . . with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah 
R. App. P. 24 (a) (9) (emphasis added). Absent compliance with this 
fundamental rule of appellate briefing, this Court is well-
justified in declining to address defendant's claim. State v. 
Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997). 
Moreover, defendant has failed to comply with rule 103 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. She did not proffer what the 
unspecified "official" document would have shown, nor did she 
articulate how the exclusion of the allegedly "significant" 
evidence would likely have brought about a different verdict. 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986). Having 
failed to establish either the content or import of this 
allegedly critical evidence, defendant has not established that 
the court committed a prejudicial error. See Utah R. Evid. 
103 (a) . 
Second, defendant has provided no legal support for her bare 
assertion that the trial court should have admitted evidence 
about the victim's character, relationships, and financial 
affairs. Defendant's cursory argument of less than a page 
contains not a single legal citation and is wholly devoid of 
legal analysis. She fails to explain the import of the position 
she takes or what legal authority would compel the result she 
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seeks. An issue is inadequately briefed when "the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 
research and argument to the reviewing court." State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Such is the case here. This 
Court should not consider defendant's claim. 
POINT FOUR 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW ANY OF 
DEFENDANT'S REMAINING CLAIMS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED 
Defendant asserts a variety of claims on appeal that are 
unpreservedf lack specificity, and are unsupported by any legal 
analysis or record citations. She largely ignores the case 
presented by the State, instead asserting a variety of 
unsupported challenges irrelevant to the case below. Thus, 
defendant argues that the victim was an "accredited investor,"5 
and that she is protected by "*Safe Harbor Laws' relating to 
^forward looking statements,'"6 matters only tangentially related 
to the crimes for which she was convicted. She vaguely asserts 
that the State improperly told the jury "that defendant could not 
do things in Utah that she actually had a legal right to do under 
both State and Federal securities laws," without ever specifying 
5
 See Br. of Aplt. at 4 (4th issue in Statement of Issues). 
6
 See Br. of Aplt. at 5 (10tn issue in Statement of Issues). 
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what those "things" are or what law would permit her to do them.7 
She claims that both the court and the State made untrue 
statements to the jury, but points to no record evidence to 
support her bald assertion.8 Finally, she asserts that her 
conduct was not "willful" but fails to cite the definition of 
that term, the evidence adduced to support the sufficiency of 
proof of the mental state, or any contrary evidence that would 
support her position.9 
All of these claims are inadequately briefed and, 
consequently, should not be considered on appeal. See, e.g. 
State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, 118, 47 P.3d 107; State 
v. Marauez, 2002 UT App 127, 512, 54 P.3d 637; see also Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9) (articulating components of adequate 
argument). In several instances, it is difficult to glean even 
the faintest outline of defendant's substantive argument. See 
id. at 14-16, 18-19. Defendant's arguments do not explain the 
law inherent in the few cases she cites, nor does she present 
any reasoned analysis based on those cases that would compel 
the result she seeks here. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 
(waiving issue based on rule 24(a) (9) requirement of meaningful 
legal analysis). 
7
 See Br. of Aplt. at 5 (8th issue in Statement of Issues). 
8
 See Br. of Aplt. at 5 (11th issue in Statement of Issues). 
9
 See Br. of Aplt. at 4 (3rd issue in Statement of Issues). 
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This Court has stated on numerous occasions that it "is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). Accordingly, M[w]hen a party fails to offer any 
meaningful analysis regarding a claim, we decline to reach the 
merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 12, 52 P.3d 467; 
accord State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, fl 13, 974 P.2d 269; State v. 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, SI 31, 973 P.2d 404; State v. Price, 827 P.2d 
247, 250 (Utah App. 1992). Where defendant has wholly failed to 
carry her burden of providing this Court with any meaningful 
legal analysis to support her claims, those claims are waived. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for securities fraud and offer/sale by an unlicensed 
broker/dealer or agent, both third degree felonies. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _2_ d ay o f January, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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